War, although inherently frightful with its carnage and bloody reality portrayed almost daily on our TV screens, still has a compelling fascination for many, particularly men, with its tales of daring, gallantry, heroism and self-sacrifice. This nostalgia seems to be heightened when tunnelling and underground activities are involved with the added claustrophobia this entails. Not only is the military miner excavating a tunnel faced with the inherent dangers this task normally involves but in wartime he faces the persistent apprehension of knowing that the enemy is working assiduously either to blow him up or cause a collapse to bury him alive or trap him underground to die a lingering death. Such heightened tensions serve to make the story of the British tunnellers on the Western Front during the First World War more compelling.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Underground warfare began at sieges where undermining, the process of gradually extracting the ground supporting the foundations of fortress walls through a tunnel driven beneath them, was used. The Egyptian Army were already using such techniques to subdue strongholds under siege some four millennia ago; by 850 BC the Assyrians had a special corps of military miners dedicated to that purpose.
In a siege once one or more critical points in the defensive walls had been identified tunnelling, if feasible, could begin where possible at a point out of sight of the defenders and beyond the range of their missiles. Such tunnels were rarely more than a few metres deep; solid rock and moats were considerable obstacles to their use. When the target was reached the end of the tunnel was enlarged to form a chamber supported with timber props beneath the foundation; the props were then set alight to cause a collapse and result in a breach in the wall above. Less often the tunnel would penetrate into the interior of the walled city and allow the attackers to emerge and surprise the defenders.
Apart from adverse ground conditions and deep wide moats the success of a mine attack depended on the response, if any, of the besieged. If they became aware of offensive tunnelling the defenders could drive their own tunnels – counter mining – to intercept their attackers and engage them in handto- hand fighting underground. Other defensive ploys included flooding or smoking out the hostile galleries or the introduction of angry bees or ferocious animals into them. In Europe gunpowder began to add a new dimension to mine warfare from the 15th Century. It enhanced the besiegers ability to destroy fortifications but also enabled the besieged to wipe out attacking tunnels with an explosion of limited extent called a camouflet without causing a crater at the ground surface. The 16th and 17th Centuries saw the replacement of castles and defensive walls by squat, more resilient structures due to improved artillery. But counteracting mining was still difficult and by the end of that period permanent systems of countermines spreading outwards from within fortresses to well beyond their defenses and ditches were quite common; however large his force of tunnellers the besieger would be compelled to engage in a lengthy underground conflict. Although this increase of military mining did not initially result in the formation of specialist units in armies by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, both France and Great Britain had specialist mining groups within their forces.
As protracted sieges became less frequent, several episodes showed that there was no reduction in the value of mining as the 19th Century progressed. In India mining was used at the sieges of Bhurtpore (1825-1826) and Lucknow in 1857, in the Crimean War at the siege of Sevastopol in 1855 and beneath Confederate trenches at the siege of Petersburg, Virginia, in 1864 during the American Civil War. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 mining by the attacking Japanese proved decisive at Port Arthur where it was again deployed against trenches.
This brings us to the 1914- 918 First World War and the mining and countermining on the Western Front and reaching a climax in the big bang at the Messines Ridge in 1917.
THE CONFLICT BEGINS
Following the rapid German advances through Belgium and into France in August 1914 the allies, Belgium, France and Great Britain, stablised the situation in September and four years of static trench warfare ensued along the Western Front, which extended from the North Sea coast to the Swiss border.
Below ground the Germans took the initiative in the British Sector; their opening move was on 20 December 1914 at Le Plantin, northern France, with the simultaneous detonation of 10 small mines beneath trenches manned by the Indian Sirhind Brigade. Again, on 25 January 1915, some 20 small charges at Cuinchy, also near La Bassee, caused heavy casualties. A significant length of frontline trench was lost and despite counter attacks by the Guards the Brigade was not recaptured. Once more on 3 February soldiers of the East Yorkshire Regiment were mined from their trenches near the village of St Eloi.
Although John Norton-Griffiths, proprietor of Griffiths & Co, a civil engineering contracting firm, and conservative MP for Wednesbury, had written to the War Office in mid-December 1914 offering to assemble a company of 'moles' it was not until 12 February 1915 that the secretary of state for war, Lord Kitchener, met with him. Initially Norton-Griffiths' letter had been filed and the proposal treated with scepticism – how could undisciplined construction workers be given one of the most onerous tasks in warfare? But needs must be met in desperate times and the upshot of the meeting was to get things really moving. Formal approval for the formation of nine tunnelling companies, each of five offices and 269 men, was given a week later.
THE TUNNELLING COMPANIES
Norton-Griffiths was a charismatic and charming individual with boundless energy and enthusiasm. Appointed a major in the Royal Engineers (RE), he was given a free hand in the development of the new tunnelling companies. A quick visit to the front had assured him that a tunnelling technique known as 'clay kicking' would be suitable for driving tunnels in the clay soils in Flanders. Clay kicking was unique to the north west of England and had been used in the construction of sewers in Manchester, Liverpool and Preston. It was a technique used to drive a tunnel so small that the miner had insufficient room to swing a pick.
The miner, supported by a substantial wooden cross set up at an angle of about 45 degrees, used a small sharp spade known as a grafting tool to stab into the clay; he then drove the tool home with his legs, and prised the clay down in chunks. Once the initial opening had been made, usually from the lower half of the face, progress was easier. The method was much quicker and more select and progress of about 8m per day was normal – considerably ahead of the enemy.
The first batch of 20 tunnellers arrived at the Tunnelling Depot, Westminster, London, on 18 February 1915 and were dispatched to RE headquarters at Chatham; all were from Norton-Griffiths' sewer contract in Manchester. Eighteen were passed fit on medical examination and were in uniform that Thursday, in Dover on Friday, France on Saturday and digging tunnels near La Bassee on Sunday as part of the 170th Tunnelling Company; none had received any militarytraining. At Chatham a batch of 66-36 coal miners and 30 clay kickers – were equipped and on their way to France on 22 February 1915; divided into two equal groups, one headed to join the clay kickers in Bethune, while the other group went by lorry to Ypres, now Ieper; they were allotted to the front line opposite the notorious Hill 60. A few days later, on the 27 February, 80 miner volunteers and two officers from the Monmouthshire Regiment joined and the 171st Tunnelling Company (TC) had been formed.
Enlisting tunnellers were assessed at Chatham. Face men who did the digging and tunnelling were of prime importance and were paid six shillings and sixpence a day. A secondary group assisted them and were responsible for bagging the spoil and removing it from the tunnel; they received two shillings and two pence per day. By comparison the daily pay of the average infantryman was one shilling and three pence. A third group were there who had been foremen in civvy street and normally became NCOs, a sprinkling of regular warrant officers from the regular army to provide some military experience.
A tunnelling company was commanded by a regular RE major or captain with four section officers with the temporary rank of subaltern. Most of the latter arrived without military experience having received only a single week's instruction at Chatham; but there were some engineers often from the Commonwealth with mining experience or relevant professional and academic qualifications.
HILL 60 ERUPTS
A little over 3km from Ypres, Hill 60 was located beside the single track railway, that ran south-eastwards to the Franco- Belgian border, where it passed through a cutting in the Messines Ridge. Surplus excavated material from the cutting had been dumped in three heaps, the largest of which peaked at an elevation of 60m, hence its name Hill 60. The others, the Caterpillar and the Dump, were to the south on the opposite side of the tracks. Like most of the Messines Ridge all three were in German hands at the beginning of 1915 and here as elsewhere in the Ypres Salient, they overlooked the British frontline.
The British were not happy with this situation although it was recognised that the German defences on the ridge were exceptionally strong. However, mining was a distinct possibility and orders were issued for tunnelling to Hill 60 and the village of St Eloi some 3km further south. Initially the equipment supplied was antiquated having lain in store since the Crimean War of 1853-56. In particular the air pumps were very noisy when operating in a situation where silence was essential if the enemy was not to be alerted and retaliate by exploding a camouflet nearby.
Although difficulties were experienced in locating and sinking the shafts near Hill 60 by 8 March 1915, three starting positions – M1, M2 and M3 – had been agreed and excavation began often in the upper layers through the decomposing bodies of dead soldiers. When the shafts reached a depth of 5m tunnelling towards the German lines commenced. Tunnels were 0.7m wide and as little as 0.9m or so high and had to be timbered in the wet sandy clay; working in shifts they advanced about 3m per day.
Some days later disaster struck at St Eloi. A German attack preceded by a barrage and the detonation of three mines beneath their trenches had driven the British from the village. It was another mining success for the enemy who were clearly ahead in the underground conflict. At Hill 60 daily rates of progress increased to over 4m as the miners dug with increasing ferocity to win the race to place and detonate their charges.
Tunnels M1 and M2 went straight into no-man's land for about 90m then branched to form two charge chambers beneath the German trenches. Excavation in them finished on 10 April and charging began. At this stage the chambers at the end of the M3 tunnel had already been loaded with two 500lb (227kg) charges of guncotton. Pairs of charges of 2,700lb (1,225kg) and 2,000lb (907kg) of gunpowder were required at M1 and M2 respectively to create craters about 18m in diameter; as gunpowder was supplied in 100lb (45kg) bags this involved the manhandling of 94 such bags into position.
All were in place, fused and ready by 15 April. The British attack began on 17 April and the mines were detonated as planned. As the debris from the explosions were still spiralling back to the ground, three British artillery brigades and two batteries with Belgium and French guns in support opened up and the infantry charged towards the Hill and captured it. The craters were all larger than expected and 171 TC had won the day.
However, the success was short lived. The breakthrough had been deep and narrow exposing the British to fire from two sides. They were still fighting three days later but despite heavy losses they still held on. But all the bravery was to no avail in the end. On the 5 May 1915 a whirling green mist of chlorine gas began to envelop the hill and its defenders who did not have gas masks were forced to retreat leaving the Germans once again in occupation.
TIT FOR TAT MINING
Other than the events at Hill 60 just described no great attempt was made to coordinate mining operations during 1915. The soldiers in the trenches preferred defensive mining operations where the enemy was active underground and to let sleeping dogs lie where he was not.
But mining still continued although more limited in scope and objectives. At St Eloi some 4km south of Ypres a small ancient tumulus known as 'The Mound', which overlooked the British trenches was targetted by 172 TC. Starting in April an array of listening posts was developed in shallow tunnels so that the British trenches could be protected with camouflets and followed up with a number of deeper attacking mines. By the end of June seven camouflets had been blown and five mines had been placed beneath German trenches and 'the Mound'. The mines detonated at intervals on the morning of 10 July 1915 saw the Germans flee their frontline trenches. Unfortunately artillery support could not be provided due to the shortage of shells and the counterattacking Germans soon regained the lost ground.
At Hooge, a village about 3km east of Ypres, 175 TC started mining in June 1915. After an unsuccessful attempt to sink a shaft through water logged sandy ground a second shaft was sunk into clay at a depth of about 11m. A tunnel 58m in length initially 2.13m high by 0.75m wide and reduced to 1.2m high as it approached beneath the pair of targeted redoubts was driven through the clay with close timbering. A charge of 4,200lb (1,905kg) of ammonal together with smaller amounts of gunpowder and guncotton were placed and tamped with several tons of bagged clay and sand. Detonated at 7pm on 19 July 1915, it created a crater about 36m in diameter and killed between 200 and 600 Germans. The whole village was now in British hands. The triumph was again short-lived and by the end of the month the Germans had regained all and more of the lost ground. It was obvious by now that attacking mines could not take and hold enemy positions alone but were of considerable value when used as a shock tactic at the beginning of an attack.
Meanwhile, much was happening to the south where British forces were replacing French as far as the River Somme. The Germans availed of the opportunities provided by the changeover to push ahead underground. Unlike the soft ground further to the north the ground here was chalk overlaid by sedimentary soils, clay with flints, loess, loam and alluvium; it was easier to excavate and required little timbering until shattered by repeated explosions. On the other hand mining activity was unavoidably noisy, the risk from carbon monoxide gas given off by explosions was much increased and it was difficult to camouflage the brilliantly white excavated material. For example when the British took over at Tambour they inherited a system of galleries 1.5m high by 0.9m wide some 4m in front of their trenches driven in the chalk and accessed by shafts about 10m deep. Smaller fighting galleries poked out towards the enemy to be used as listening posts and to charge and fire camouflets when a German approach was detected. The enemy was doing much the same and several German headings had been pushed forward during the takeover period and had to be repulsed. A nerve wrecking game of blind man's buff ensued as the rival miners sought to outsmart each other. Many miners were killed underground mostly by camouflets either crushed by collapse of their tunnel or trapped in a pocket of carbon monoxide.
As time passed, deeper tunnels were driven at depths from about 21 to 31m down and so the gruesome routine of probe and counter attack continued to the end of 1915 and into 1916.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The aim of this British offensive commencing on 1 July 1916 was to relieve pressure on the French forces defending Verdun in the south. It opened with the firing with seven large and 11 small mines along a 29km front stretching from Maricourt near the River Somme in the south to Gommecourt in the north.
In April just 10 weeks before the attack each of the five TCs involved received their instructions for attacking mines and for galleries to provide advanced emplacements for machine guns and mortars; they were also expected to maintain their defensive systems.
These requirements put great pressure on resources but the response of the miners was excellent. For example, one tunnel 1.2m high by 0.7m wide was driven 183m in 28 days including 61m in a single week. The 40,000lb (18,144kg) of ammonal in the mines beneath the redoubt at Beaumont Hamel was excavated in dry chalk at a depth of 20m; it was fired at 0720hrs on the 1 July some 10 minutes before zero hours and resulted in a crater 20m deep and 55m wide.
Near La Boisselle the mine known as Y'Sap with the same weight of charge fired a minute before zero hour produced a similar effect. Less than 1km to the south Lochnagar consisting of twin charges of 36,000 and 24,000lbs (16,330 and 10,586kg) of ammonal placed about 20m apart resulted in a crater some 22m deep and 80m wide; it had destroyed mine dugouts killing hundreds.
But the attack that followed did not go at all well and by the end of the the first day the British had lost 57,470 men either killed, wounded or missing. The campaign was scaled down and ended with the onset of winter weather in November. By then British casualties had increased to 410,000 while the French of a shorter front south of the River Somme had lost 190,000 men. For this, just a paltry hundred square kilometers had been captured,
